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THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE INSURANCE
CONTRACT: A FEW SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
STUDY
"What do they know of the law of the insurance contract who only the
law of contract know?"*
FRANKLIN M. SCHULTZt
John Doe picks up the phone and dials his insurance agent. "I just bought my
wife a mink coat for our twenty-fifth anniversary," says Doe. "It set me back
$3,500. I'd like to insure it at full value."
"Sure," replies the agent, "I'll write it up on a floater right away and send you
the policy. The premium will run about $64." Several weeks later Doe receives
the policy and a bill in the mail. He notes the policy is a "fur floater" and in the
amount of $3,500., He puts it in his strong box and writes out a check for the
amount of the bill on the first of the month when he pays his other monthly bills.
• If you were to ask Doe what he has done, he would probably say that he has
"bought" some insurance. From whom has he bought it? His local agent-the
one that handles his "general" insurance; another agent handles his life insurance.
Does he know which company issued the policy? No, and he doesn't care. Does
he question the amount of the premium? No-he understands that is "standard."
Does he know whether his wife's coat is covered under all circumstances? No-he
hasn't read the policy; he tried to read one once and fell asleep in the process; he
assumes his agent took care of full coverage. Does he know how long the policy
runs? No-he assumes three years; the agent always takes care of renewals and bills
him as a matter of course. Has he signed any paper? No-he never does in these
insurance deals unless it involves life insurance. Does he realize he has entered into
an insurance contract? No-he has never thought of it in that way.
Now, if one were to ask what John Doe has done in the "eye of the law," the
response would probably be: Doe has entered into a unilateral, aleatory contract, the
consideration on his side being the payment of an insurance premium, the considera-
tion on the other side being a promise to indemnify for a three year period in the
event the mink coat disappears-subject to numerous conditions, as, for example, that
Doe make proof of loss within sixty days, cooperate with the insurer in recovering
the property, bring any action against the insurer within two years, etc. Should Doe
fail to comply with any of these conditions pr&edent or subsequent, as the case may
be, he cannot recover from the insurer.
* EDwIN H. WOODRUFF, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 5 (2d ed. 1924).
-A.B. 1939, LL.B. 1942, Yale University. Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law. Member of the Ohio Bar.
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There are at least two points to make about the "lay" as compared with the
"law" reaction to this simple business transaction. One is that "language-wise" they
are poles apart. Doe is speaking of having "bought" something, which he may call
"protection" or "coverage"; the law speaks of his having entered, through bargain-
ing and negotiation, a "contract"-a consensual, continuing relationship. Second, the
legal term-unilateral, aleatory contract-which the "law" uses to classify Doe's
transaction embraces many other commercial and non-commercial transactions. Doe,
for example, would have entered into a unilateral, aleatory contract if he had given
a prospector $ioo to stake out a claim in Alaska in return for the prospector's promise
of $io,ooo if the grubstake turned out to be a bonanza. Yet, traditionally in both
the insurance and grubstake transactions, the contractual presuppositions are the
same: each party knew with whom he was dealing; each bargained, haggled, or
dickered over the consideration to be received; each knew exactly what he was
receiving in return for what he gave (a premium or cash for a promise of cash in
the future on the happening of a contingency-loss of a mink coat or "striking it
rich"); and finally, each assented to the "bargain" in every respect, i.e., there was a
"'meeting of the minds." Crane, J., speaking for the New York Court of Appeals,
summarizes the traditional view thus: "A contract for insurance is no different than
any other contract. The insurance company is entitled to have its contract enforced
by the courts as written."' But one need only run through modern legal literature
to discover that there has long been a strong dissent from the traditional tendency
to lump insurance contracts with other contracts. Burch, J., speaking for the Kansas
Supreme Court, was among the first to strike this dissident note. "The subject,
therefore, is sui generis, and the rules of a legal system devised to govern the forma-
tion of ordinary contracts between man and man cannot be mechanically applied
to it."'2 If one were to paraphrase Judge Burch's phrase "sui generis" in modern
terms, it might read: Insurance protection, first, is a necessity, in almost a class with
everyday utilities such as water, gas, and light. As in the case of utilities, neither
the price nor other terms are bargained for. Embodied in a printed, standardized,
mass-produced form, drawn up by the insurer's lawyers, and presented to the buyer
as a finished product, insurance is one of the few complicated legal transactions a
layman enters into without a lawyer at his elbow. It is undoubtedly as detailed
and complex as a contract for the sale of land, a deed, or a will, none of which a
careful layman would undertake to negotiate without benefit of counsel. Moreover,
the insured deals directly with an agent and is seldom concerned about the identity
of the principal (except in life insurance). Once received by the insured, the policy
is seldom read, almost never fully understood. In a word, an insurance transaction
is a one-sided "bargain"; if it merits the label "contract," it is in a very specialized,
not an ordinary, sense.
'Drilling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 234, 241, 137 N. E. 314, 316 (1922).
'Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 97, 102, 116 Pac. 245, 247 (19,'). I am indebted
to Dean Havighurst for pointing out the juxtaposition of this opinion with the Drilling case, svepra note I,
in GEORGE NV. GOBLE, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 872, 876 (2d ed. 1949).
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It is not the purpose of this article to examine the validity of such a modern
definition of the typical insurance transaction by means of an exhaustive study, but
rather to inquire whether recent developments in insurance law justify some such
study and, if so, to suggest some possible avenues for investigation.
I
CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS iN GENRAL
Despite Justice Holmes's sweeping statement that "no rational theory of con-
tract can be made that does not hold the assured to know the contents of the
instrument to which he seeks to hold the other party, '3 and the Restatement's black
'letter rule binding a party who should have "reasonably" understood an offer or
proposed contract, "though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper inter-
pretation,"4 all the king's horses and all the king's men have been unable to hold to-
gether this principle-the so-called objective theory of contracts-as it relates to in-
surance agreements. Long ago Professor Vance, one of the great experts in insur-
ance law, asserted that the public at large and some courts acknowledged "the pre-
vailing business custom" of "even careful business men" not to read their policies
but to rely on "the accuracy, skill and good faith of the agent."5 Williston in his
monumental treatise on contracts also acknowledges the large number of decisions
which can be explained only by the "well-recognized, though negligent, practice of
most purchasers of insurance not to read their policies, but to rely on the agent's
good faith and skill."6
In fact, the improbability that the ordinary insurance buyer will read his policy
has led to practical abandonment of the parol evidence rule in insurance cases on
the ground that it is unrealistic to speak of "integration" where there is no true bar-
gain or acceptance.7 Similarly, the cases are legion where, the insured having relied
on the unauthorized oral representation of the insurer's agent, the familiar waiver,
estoppel, and reformation devices have been used to overcome the failure of the
insured to note that the contents of the policy differed from the agent's representa-
tion.
Moreover, although many judges pay lip-service to the proposition that an insur-
ance contract should be construed as any other contract, the real purpose of the
construction being to give full effect to the expressed intention of the parties,' it is a
matter of common knowledge that where any doubt or ambiguity exists in an insur-
ance policy it will be resolved against the draftsman, i.e., the insurance company.
'Lumber Underwriters of New York v. Rife, 237 U. S. 605, 609 (19x5).
"RrESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS 570 (1932).
r'WILUAam R. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF INSURAMCOE 215 (2d ed. 1930).
'SAM,uEL WILLISTON, A TREAnsE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §751 (rev. ed., Williston and Thomp-
son, 1936).
'See Note, 47 HARV. L. REv. ioo (1934).
'See Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 87 (1948); Comment, 35 YAs.E L. J. 203 (z925).
V.NC-E, op. ci. supra note 5, at 689-69o.
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This so-called rule of strict construction is the hallmark of a "contract of adhesion"'"
of which insurance is the classic example. The premise is that the insurance con-
tract is drawn up by the insurance company, which, staffed with expert legal counsel,
has drafted the policy to serve its best interests and that the insured, who-usually
without the benefit of any counsel-merely "adheres" to it, has little choice as to its
terms."' Consequently, the company must pay the penalty for any ambiguity it
unluckily creates in the process. Worse still, from the company's point of view at
least, is the tendercy of the courts to "discover" such ambiguities. Take New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Hiatt,'2 for example. The question was whether a
beneficiary could recover double indemnity on a life insurance policy when the
insured's death resulted from the inhalation of carbon monoxide, one of the nine
causes excepted from the double indemnity rider. In mistaken compliance with a
California statute requiring a brief description to be printed on the first page and
the filing back of the policy, the company had stamped on the cover page in purple
ink: "Double Indemnity for Fatal Accident." This was its undoing. The ninth
circuit affirmed the district judge's conclusion that the stamped writing superseded the
printed rider, saying: 3
... to the lay mind the phrase represents the concise expression of a readily comprehensible
thought. The average layman knows what double indemnity means and he has a pretty
fair notion of what a fatal accident is. To him the term comprehends all forms of death
suffered accidentally. Not inconceivably, the presence of the stamped matter was the
decisive factor in effecting the sale of the policy.
There was no evidence of any reliance by the insured on the stamped matter or
on any related representation by the soliciting agent or the company's advertising
matter. Yet a unanimous court thought that even if the insured had read the
whole instrument, it would probably leave in his "uninitiated mind the belief that
the specially stamped phraseology was intended to afford a measure of protection
broader than that indicated in the printed language of the rider.'
14
Sic semper the insurer. You may not be able to tell a book by its cover, unless it's
an insurance policy-and you are the beneficiary.
One would expect this one-way street, the strict construction canon, to have passed
into oblivion once the statutory insurance form had entered the stage. If the legis-
lature prescribes a standard form of policy or standard provisions to be incorporated,
or the insurance commissioner has approved a company form, it can hardly be said
the policy was "drafted" solely by the company.' 5 As a matter of fact, since such
1' Patterson, in The Delivery of A Life-insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REv. 198, 222 (i959), first
introduced the term from the French law into our vocabulary.
1Ibid.
22 X4o F. 2d 752 (9 th Cir. 1044). "Id. at 753.
"Ibid.; cf. Northern Trust Co. v. The Central Life Ins. Co., 274 Ill. App. 551 (1934).
15 Some courts have abandoned the strict construction rule in this instance. See, e.g., Wilcox v.
Masachusetts Protective Ass'n, 266 Mass. 230, 165 N. E. 429 (1929); Rosenthal v. Insurance Co. of North
America, x58 Wis. 550, 149 N. W. i55 (1914); Gallopin v. Continental Casualty Co., 290 Ill. App. 8,
7 N. E. 2d 771 (1937).
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policy provisions are presumably drafted by the stdte agencies, representing all the
policyholders, logically, the language should be construed against the insured rather
than the company.' But the logic of this argument fails to square with the case
results. In the main the courts still reach judgment for plaintiff by construing the
standard policies against the company, just as if they were still drafted by the com-
pany.17
The judicial rationales make interesting reading. As early as 1911, a North Caro-
lina court, quoting Professor Vance, stated that since the "terms of these statutory
policies were chosen with reference to the construction given by the precedent cases
to similar terms in other policies, and, therefore, ought to be regarded as being used
in the sense of their previous construction,"'" there was no reason to abandon the
strict construction rule. The court also explained that the statutory terms were
really chosen by the underwriters with particular reference to their own interests,
and hence should be construed strictly against them as the real villains of the piece.
Such a charge could be well substantiated as to the i886 standard fire policy, which
was prepared exclusively by the New York Board of Fire Underwriters (a private in-
surance group), 9 but could hardly be supported as to the latest 1943 standard
policy.20 A recent North Carolina court has added this rationale: "The rights of
the parties after the policy has been issued must be ascertained and determined in
accordance with the terms and provisions of the contract and derive no extra validity
by reason of the fact that the form is prescribed by law."'" In other words, even
though the form of the policy is legislatively prescribed, the insurance contract still
derives its validity from the "consent" of the parties.'
Logic, it seems, particularly as related to the contract canons of construction, finds
little support in the insurance literature.
II
THE LiFE CYCLE OF A LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT
In addition to the study of the peculiar rules of construction just noted, another
way to determine whether modern judges recognize the uniqueness of the insur-
ance contract is to examine in terms of recent litigation several phases in the life
6 See Calhoun, The Liberal Construction of Insurance Contracts, I CONN. BAR J. 49, 50 (1927).
" VANCE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 691.
" Gazzam v. German Union Fire Ins. Co., 155 N. C. 330, 338-339, 71 S. E. 434, 438 (191i).
1" EDWIN W. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 249 (1927).
"°Patterson, Insurance Law During the War Years, 46 COL. L. REv. 345, 347 (1946).
2' Atlantic Joint Stock Land Bank of Raleigh v. Foster, 217 N. C. 415, 419, 8 S. E. 2d 235, 237
(1940).
" It has also been suggested that "even a statute adopted for the purpose of avoiding the equivocalitics
of company-drafted policies may be ambiguous. In such a situation, public policy may similarly require
construction against the insurer, by predicating it not upon the drafter's fault, but upon the risk-sharing
purpose of insurance." 44 COL. L. REV. 766, 770-771 (1944). It is a little difficult to see how the insurers
cquld share the risk of "ambiguities" in the statutory form unless they could pre-estimate the cost of
litigation and judgments resulting from discoverable ambiguities and increase the premium rates accord-
ingly.
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history of an insurance contract. For this purpose the life insurance transaction is
probably better laboratory material than fire, casualty, or some other type of in-
surance. From the average individual's point of view, life is the keystone of insur-
ance protection; it represents not only the sole security but the bulk of total savings
and most acceptable loan collateral of the vast majority of people. As compared with
fire and casualty, it also comes closer, though not very close, to the classical bar-
gained-for contractual transaction. At least, between the first approach of the life
agent ("no one has endurance like the man who sells insurance") and the delivery
of the policy there is a waiting period which may suggest the possibility for
negotiation, bargaining, perhaps even re-drafting. The insurer examines the subject
of the contract, the insured, before delivery, not after, as in casualty insurance.
Here the insured signs a paper, not the policy, it is true, but an application which
becomes a part of the policy. Hence, if the label "contract" in its classical sense is to
fit any modern insurance transaction (other than re-insurance, reciprocal insurance,
or the like where near equal bargainers are involved), life insurance would appear
the most likely candidate.
A. Formation of Contract: The Application for Life Insurance
To trace the life cycle of a life insurance contract, one normally begins with
the application. At this stage an investigation discloses two frequently recurring
contract-formation situations which reveal unusual judicial attitudes. One is where
the life insurance applicant dies while the company is still processing his application
and it is charged that the company has unreasonably delayed approval. The other
is where under similar circumstances it is alleged that the applicant was already
"insured" because he had paid the first premium and received a "binding receipt"
in return.
Professor Kessler has recently demonstrated that courts which have dealt with
the first situation have been unable to agree as to who shall bear the risk of "loss
without insurance" caused by the unreasonable delay of the insurer.2 3 Those courts
which view the application as a "bare offer" imposing no liability on the company
until it is accepted, cannot find the "acceptance" essential to recovery in contract,
nor can they find the requisite consideration for an implied promise on the part
of the company to act promptly, since the applicant is free to withdraw his offer
at any time before acceptance and seek insurance elsewhere. Though there is an
almost unanimous feeling' against recovery in contract as "contrary to the well
settled principles of contract law," the majority of courts still allow recovery by the
"back door," so to speak, on a tort theory. The failure of the company to take
prompt action is said to be tantamount to a breach of a general duty towards the
"2 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COL. L. Rlv. 629
'(1943)-
2A few courts have based recovery on contract. E.g., Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons,
96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923).
382 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
public to act without undue delay on applications involving acceptable risks. Kessler
says that the courts which espouse this view-
are sure that the policy of insurance cannot be treated like any other contract. The state,
by granting a franchise to the insurance company, by regulating and supervising its
business, recognizes the great social importance of insurance business; it is, therefore, in
the public interest that applications for acceptable risks shall not be unduly delayed. Thus
the courts pay merely lip service to the dogma that the common law of contracts governs
insurance contracts. With the help of the law of torts they nullify those parts of the
law of contracts which in the public interest are regarded as inapplicable.
The second situation to reveal an unorthodox judicial attitude toward forma-
tion-of-contract principles centers around the legal consequences of prepayment of
the first premium by a life insurance applicant who dies subsequent to the medical
examination but prior to final approval. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co.26 posed the problem to one of our most distinguished courts. The relevant
facts were simple. On August 3, Gaunt signed a life insurance application and paid
the soliciting agent the full first premium for which he received a receipt which read
in part: "if the company is satisfied that on the date of the completion of [the medical
part] of this application I was insurable and if this application [including the
medical part] is, prior to my death, approved by the company at its Home Office,
the insurance applied for shall be in force as of the date of completion of [the medi-
cal part]. ' On the same day the company's local examining physician found
Gaunt insurable and recommended the risk for acceptance. After the company
received satisfactory reports from several re-examinations of Gaunt made at its re-
quest, the medical department of the home office on August 26 approved the applica-
tion from a medical standpoint. But the home office, having received word on the
same day that Gaunt had been kiled prior to this medical approval, refused to give
the application final approval, though the trial judge found that if Gaunt had lived,
it would have done so.
It was evident that the application was not finally approved at the home office
"prior to" Gaunt's death. Nevertheless, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court,
affirmed a judgment for Gaunt's beneficiary. Admitting that, literally read, the
" Id. at 635. Kessler's incisive comment raises the question whether the insurance contract is "affected
with a public interest." Ever since the landmark German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389
(1914), it has been assumed almost without question that the insurance business, in its various ramifi-
cations, is "affected with a public interest." Justice McKenna, speaking for a bare majority, there
recognized that insurance contracts had "greater public consequences than contracts between individuals
to do or not to do a particular thing whose effect stops with the individual." Id. at 413. There is no
intimation, however, that the Court regarded "the insurance corporation as a public service company,
under a legal duty to insure upon reasonable terms all properly qualified applicants--just as a railroad
company is under a similar duty to furnish transportation," a point toward which, Patterson once sug-
gested, the law might be tending. Patterson, supra note xo, at 216. At most, the insurance business
is a quasi-public utility, although as a constitutional matter, it is arguable that the states always had,
and the federal government now has, the power to regard it as a full-fledged public utility, owing duties
to the public as to the negotiation and writing as well as the pricing of its contracts.
26 s6o F. 2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), 6o HARv. L. REv. 1164.
2 Id. at 599-6oo.
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clause did not cover the insured if he died after completion of the medical part but
before approval at the home office, Judge Hand searched the record for a rational
quid pro quo which the insured might have received for having prepaid the first
full premium. Unpersuaded by the company's recital of six incidental benefits,2
Judge Hand took the position that29
an underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context, but the applica-
tion was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to persons utterly unacquainted
with the niceties of life insurance, who would read it colloquially. It is the understanding
of such persons that counts; and not one in a hundred would suppose that he would be
covered not "as of the date of completion of [the medical part]," as the defendant
promised, but only as of the date of approval. ... the ordinary applicant who has paid
his first premium and has successfully passed his physical examination, would not by the
remotest chance understand the clause as leaving him uncovered until the insurer at its
leisure approved the risk; he would assume that he was getting immediate coverage for
his money .... A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not;
but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance
intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion.
But Judge Clark, concurring, could not find this "confusion" in the company's
forms of application and receipt. Between equal bargainers, the Judge noted, there
was no question but that the insurance was not intended to take effect until the
condition precedent of home office approval was met, and that it then dated back
to an earlier time. Furthermore, was it not a little late for his experienced brethren
(the two Hands) to "evince surprise" at a condition as widely used as this receipt
form? Judge Clark favored the result, however, because the course of negotiations
required and controlled by the insurance company was "unpardonable," but he
would place the result squarely on the inequity of this kind of bargaining rather
than upon a strained interpretation which "seems sure to produce continuing un-
certainty in the law of insurance contracts.""0
Judge Clark doesn't spell out what was "unpardonable" in the course of negotia-
tions between the applicant and the company. The facts as stated by Judge Hand
include no representation by the soliciting agent that the insurance was to be
effective from the moment Gaunt paid and the agent gave Gaunt a receipt for the
flrst premium. Was it unpardonable for the company to take Gaunt's money and
hand him a form receipt which deferred its liability until final approval of the
application? Judge Clark may be sugggesting something of this sort. If so, he is
attacking a basic method of selling life insurance employed by some of the leading
"'The six possible "advantages" to the insured were: "(1) The policy would sooner become in-
contestable. (2) It would earlier reach maturity, with a corresponding acceleration of dividends and cash
rurrender. (3) It would cover the period after approval and before issue. (4) If the insured became
uninsurablc between completion and approval, it would still cover the risk. (5) If the insured's birthday
was between completion and approval, the premium would be computed at a lower rate. (6) When the
policy covers disability, the coverage dates from completion." Id. at 6oi. It is fairly certain that in
any other contract situation, these six advantages would satisfy any minimal theory of consideration.
"Id. at 6o-6o2.
" I. 2t 603.
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life companies every day of the week, and presumably approved by the state insur-
ance departments. What would Judge Clark consider an "equitable" course of
dealing? Temporary coverage such as is given for fire and casualty insurance?
But this would put the life insurer in a precarious position in the event the applicant
was found to be uninsurable. No one will deny that the life insurer should have
a reasonable time to investigate an application from both a medical and financial
standpoint. But at the same time, the insurer would like to protect itself against
an out-of-pocket loss for medical and investigation expenses in the event the appli-
cant backs out. As Judge Clark points out, some companies obtain the desired
result by making the insurance effective from the date of the medical examination
if the insurer in its judgment shall be "satisfied" as to the insurability of the
.applicant on that date. Several writers have favored the "satisfaction" type receipt
form as the more desirable business practice 3 Judge Clark would frankly redraft
the contract to read in terms of this better practice because of the inequitable bar-
gaining which occurred; Judge Hand would call the receipt form ambiguous and
construe it against the draftsman under the strict construction rule. Either device,
equitable or interpretative, leads to the single conclusion that in the formation of life
insurance contracts, some judges will not be bound by classical rules of general
contract.
B. Performance: Aviation Risk Exclusion Clauses in World War II
Performance in a life insurance contract, as compared with other types of insur-
ance, is aleatory only in the sense that the time of the insured event is fortuitous, the
event itself being as inevitable as taxes. For purposes of actuarial computation, the
life insurer seeks to limit performance on the insured's death to normal, ascertainable
risks; hence it rules out extra-hazardous occupations. Until recently, most companies
attempted to rule out any participation in aviation as such an abnormal risk, not only
in ordinary life policies but in their accidental death benefit and double indemnity
provisions. The accent on aviation in the recent war resulted in a spate of
opinions construing these aviation exceptions.
The aviation clause made its debut in the Twenties when participation in aviation
was still a daredevil stunt. Some of the early clauses, which were clearly directed
against any and all kinds of activity having to do with flying, were actually not put
to the test until the late Thirties or Forties, by which time commercial aviation had
become both customary and respectable. In 193i, the New York Court of Appeals'
was called upon in the Gibbs case32 to interpret a double indemnity clause "for'
death by accident, unless it should result from or be caused directly or indirectly
by ' . . . engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expedi-
tions.' "3 The insured was killed while a passenger on a commercial flight. The
" See Havighurit, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 ILL. L. REV. x8o, x86 (1938); Comment,
Operation of Binding Receipts in Life Insurance, 44 YALE L. J. 1223 (1935).
"Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 256 N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144 (1935).
"Id. at 209, 176 N. E. at 144.
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court, recognizing that in "1924, when this policy was written, submarines, airplanes,
dirigibles, even balloons had not been developed to the condition in which they
exist today,"34 decided the clause intended to exclude every aviation risk, even
regularly scheduled commercial flights. A dozen years later, however, when the
New York Court of Appeals in the Hartol Products case3 5 had to decide whether a
i93o accidental death benefit clause (which excluded death resulting "'from having
been engaged in military or naval service in time of war; or in submarine operations
or in aviation or aeronautics, as a passenger or otherwise ... ,',) covered the in-
sured who had been killed while a fare-paying passenger on a regularly scheduled
flight over an established route, the beneficiary was permitted to recover the $5oooo
at stake. Though the clause read practically word for word like the one in the Gibbs
case, this time the court found abundant ambiguity in the word "engaged" (par-
ticularly its use in an occupational sense in reference to military service and sub-
marine operations, and in a different sense in reference to aviation). Appealing to a
lay reaction to this "ambiguity," the majority asserted that the "average person
applying for a policy would no more think of a passenger on an airplane as being
engaged in aviation or aeronautics than he would think of a passenger on a railroad
train as being engaged in railroading or a passenger on an ocean liner as being en-
gaged in navigation."37  In order to distinguish the Gibbs case, the court quoted
"passenger air mile" statistics for i93o to prove that a trip by air was not "uncommon
for the average individual, was neither an extraordinary event nor accompanied by
unusual hazards" 3 -- a paraphrase of air travel in 1924 as described by the Gibbs
court. The court saw nothing in the Gibbs opinion to foreclose "consideration of
current changes in the common understanding of the ordinary everyday meaning
of words and phrases which changing conditions of life over a lapse of time have
effected." 9  The lapse of time, it should be noted, was only six years, and the
court did not take the pains to quote "passenger air mile" statistics .for 1924.' .
One would expect that the aviation risk clause would fare no better in the w ar-
time aviation death cases. In the 1946 Clapper case,41 the circuit court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia construed a policy issued in 1928 providing for double indemnity
"if the death of the insured occurs ... from bodily inju~ries effected solely through
external, violent, and accidental means . . [and] not . . from an aeronautic
flight... ,"42 to cover a situation where the insured, a famous correspondent, lost his
"Id. at 21o, 176 N. E. at X45.
"Hartol Products Corp. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 29o N. Y. 44, 47 N. E. 2d 687(1943).
"Id. at 46, 47 N. E. 2d at 689. I Id. at 48, 47 N. E. 2d at 689-690.
"Id. at 51, 47 N. E. 2d at 69 .
"Lehman, C. J., and Desmond, J., dissented on the ground that "by the clear and unambiguous
language of the policy the accident was excluded from the coverage of the 'accidental death benefit
provisions.'" Ibid.
'o On the general problem, see the exhapstive study by Glass, Aeronautic Risk Exclusion in Life In-
surance Contracts, 7 J. AIR L. 305, 560 (1936).
"Clapper v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., i57 F. 2d 76 (D. C. Cir. 1946), 14 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 693 (1947).
"' Clapper v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra.
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life while an invited guest-passenger on a naval flight in the Marshall Islands. Here,
there was no justification for the court to bring the policy clause up to date, because
it would not be within "common understanding," that such a clause covered a
military flight at the time of insured's death any more than in 1928. Relying on
Webster's New International Dictionary, the court suggested, however, that
"aeronautic flight" had an occupational significance, and "even if this interpretation
is subject to challenge, the same result would follow, since at best the phrase is so
ambiguous as to compel a decision in favor of the insured."43  The decision is
questionable on two counts: Was the phrase ambiguous? Even if so, would not a
reasonable person expect it to exclude a military flight?
On its side the insurer had as an additional excuse in many of the World War
II cases a war risk clause. But the availability of a war risk clause often turned
out to be a two-edged weapon. For example, in the Schifter case,44 where in one
clause the policy expressly excluded war-time military and naval service but by a
later endorsement covered continental war service, and the insured was killed in a
state-side training flight, admittedly excluded by the aviation risk clause, the New
York court held the insured covered by the endorsement which spoke of all kinds
of continental military service. Because of the internal contradiction, the result
here seems reasonable. It does not, however, in the Conaway case4" where the failure
of the insurer to insert in the policy proper a war risk clause while incorporating it
in the double indemnity clause led the Ohio Supreme Court to draw the negative
inference that the insurer did not intend its aviation risk clause to apply where the
insured had met his death while piloting a military craft on a military mission.
Though war was imminent when the insured applied for the policy, the majority
interpreted the phrase in the policy "on account of the aviation hazard of the
insured" to read "civilian aviation hazard" and accordingly gave judgment for
the beneficiary.4" Even if war was not imminent, one wonders whether a reason-
able man would not perceive that an insurance company concerned with the risks
incident to civil aviation would a fortiori be concerned with the risk incident to
military aviation.
If the above cases can be considered at all typical, the courts seem here, as com-
pared with their treatment of the formation-of-contract cases, to have done more than
balance the scales in favor of the insured's reasonable expectations. Perhaps the
results suggest the extremes to which the "interpretative device" can be put, once
it becomes accepted as a tool of judicial construction.
"Id. at 77.
"Schifter v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n of America, X83 Misc. 74, 50 N. Y. S.
2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
'n Conaway v. The Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 148 Ohio St. 598, 76 N. E. 2d 284 (1947) (three
judges dissented).
' See also Quinones v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee, 2o9 La. 76, 24 So. 2d 270 (945),
where the aviation rider in the usual form covering fare-paying flights only was held to cover a routine
military flight.
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C. Discharge: Settlement Practices
A third stage open to possible* investigation in the life cycle of a life policy pre-
sents itself after the death of the insured when the insurer attempts to "settle" with
the beneficiary. Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'nY a 1947 Iowa decision,
suggests that the classical contract rule of accord and satisfaction may be by-passed
where a court concludes the insurer has been over-reaching in making a quick
settlement with the beneficiary. In the Kellogg case the defendant insurer, a fraternal
association, refused to pay the plaintiff beneficiary the full $5,000 in the membership
certificate on the ground that the insured's death, which occurred within an hour
after a highway collision, had been "effected or aggravated by heart disease," in
which event the insurer's liability was limited to xo per cent, or $5oo, a check
for which the company had sent the plaintiff in full settlement, and which check
plaintiff had cashed. Though it is arguable that there was not an effective accord
and satisfaction because the part payment was not tendered in satisfaction of a dis-
puted or unliquidated claim and thus came within the prohibition of Foakes v.
Beer,4 the Iowa Supreme Court stressed at some length that this was a situation
"where the relationship between the parties is closely akin to a fiduciary one, and
where the insurer should be most meticulous and conscientiously scrupulous to pro-
tect the rights of the beneficiary and to give every opportunity to fully establish her
rights."4 The spokesman for the three dissenting judges did not let the opportunity
pass to point out that no authority was cited for this novel theory of fiduciary re-
lationship which undercut the traditional assumption that "the parties were dealing
at 'arm's length.' Defendant owed to the beneficiary the duty it would owe to any
other person with whom it dealt-the duty to deal uprightly." In effect, the dis-
senters did not see that the "settlement" in this case differed from one between a
grocer and his debtor.
The Kellogg case carries recognition of the inequality of the bargaining power
of the parties beyond the negotiation stage over into the final settlement stage. In
so doing it makes orthodox contract notions such as accord and satisfaction burst
at the seams. Life insurance, of course, is not the only kind of one-sided transaction
which has recently been subjected to the same kind of judicial treatment, as witness
the railroad release cases. 5'
III
LEGISLATIVE CONCERN WITH THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
If, as the recent cases seem to indicate, the judges have such difficulty squaring
the general principles of contract law with the facts of insurance life, one might
"Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 239 Iowa 196, 29 N. W. 2d 559 (1947), 16 U. o
CHi. L. REV. 177 (948).
489 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
"Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 239 Iowa 196, 213, 29 N. W. 559, 568 (1947).
" Id. at 232, 29 N. W. 2d at 578.
" See Frank, J., concurring in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. R., 153 F. 2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946);
c/. Callen v. Pennsylvania R. R., 332 U. S. 625 (1948).
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expect the legislators to have stepped into the breach. Unquestionably, the legis-
latures have been pressured into much remedial action in the last few decades, such
as the development of the 1943 New York standard fire policy, the statutes con-
verting strict warranties into representations, and the requirement of standard pro-
visions in life policies. It is also true that both the life and fire insurance industries
have recently been subjected to public scrutiny, the former in the 194o TNEC in-
vestigation," the latter in the Congressional hearings-' before and after the 1944
South-Eastern Underwriters decision 4 The TNEC investigation was mainly con-
cerned with the impact on the economy of life insurance company investment policy;
the Congressional hearings on the South-Eastern case with monopolistic practices
in the fixing of fire insurance rates. While the TNEC investigation directly at-
tacked the problem of the relationships between insurer and insured in regard to
agency practices and industrial insurance, " ' at no point was there a consideration of
the basic nature of the insurance contract. The closest approach to the problem
was one of the TNEC final recommendations that "the number of policy forms
should be reduced and greater attention given to establishing standardized policy
forms or policy provisions acceptable in all states. The present confusion in this
field is most undesirable."5 Sumner Pike in summarizing the investigation, pointed
out that "we have ... one or two of the [life] companies that had over 130 technically
different forms of policy which could be presented." 7
IV
LEGAL WRITING ON THE INSURANCE CONTRACT
The judges, as I have indicated, have not been able to meet the challenge of the
standardized life insurance contract largely because of the piecemeal fashion in
which the problem has arisen in the litigated cases. The legislators, on their part,
have recently been more concerned with the investment and price-fixing aspects of
the problem than with its contractual side. One might expect that the legal writers,
who occupy a relatively objective position, would have delved into the problem and
come up with some recommendations directed toward either a legislative or judicial
change of policy. It is surprising, therefore, to find a real dearth of American legal
literature on the insurance contract qua standardized contract. There is nothing,
for instance, comparable to Prausnitz's pioneering study of English and continental
a See GESELL AND HOWE, STUDY OF LEOA.. REsERvE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES (TNEC Monograph
28, 1940).
" See Joint Hevings before Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H. R.
3269, and H. R. 3270, 7 8th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (x943-944.)
"" United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (x944) (declaring insurance in
interstate commerce).
" GESELL AND HOWE, op. cit. supra note 52, § §XV, XVI.
r TNEC, FINAL REPORTS AND RECOMIMENDATIONS, SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (194!).
Id. at 567. As to industrial insurance, Mr. Pike said: "The number of policy forms available and
variations in policy provisions are highly undesirable and conducive to misrepresentation and misunder-
standing on the part of the policyholder." Id. at 598.
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standardized contracts. 8 Cohen, Isaacs, and Llewellyn have probed the standardized
contract in general, 9 Llewellyn's review of Prausnitz's book being one of the
most incisive short statements of the problem extant." Recently, Kessler has con-
tributed a brilliant essay on the standardized contract and freedom of contract, with
special reference to the insurance contract." ' Some of the best thinking on standard-
ized contracts in general has, and this should come as no surprise, appeared in the
student sections of the law reviews. 2 But nowhere has there been a serious, full
dress attempt to re-define the modern American insurance transaction as a sui
geneis matter.
Perhaps the job is too big, or too dull. Admittedly, the volume of case law is
overwhelming. In 1944-a war year-the reporter on insurance for the New York
University Annual Survey examined 6oo appellate decisions," only a part of the
"flood of reported decisions ... growing more unmanageable every year," to stem
which the late Sidney Post Simpson whimsically suggested a "moratorium on law
reporting until legal thinking catches up with the writing of judicial opinions." '64
V
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
If the legal writers-who occupy the enviable position of sitting on the sidelines
and watching the lawyers, judges, legislators, and administrators "operate" the in-
surance transaction-were to make a serious effort to re-examine the special nature
of the insurance contract, where would they begin?
First, an exhaustive study of the recent volume of case law would enable one to
determine whether the tentative hypothesis this paper suggests-that there is de-
veloping a separate body of insurance contract law which has little relation to the
"general principles of contract law"--can be accepted as an established proposition.
Such a study may reveal that the courts are creating hosts of special rules, only a few
of which have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, to handle insurance cases
within the framework of general contract law.
If this proposition as to the sui generis nature of insurance law was established,
the next step would be an examination of the consequences for both insured and
insurer. Do the special rules of construction enable the insured to obtain his
reasonable expectations and to satisfy his insurance needs? At what cost does he
'8 OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
LAw (1937).
r" See, e.g., Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553 (1933); Isaacs, The Standardizing
of Contracts, 27 YALE L. J. 34 (1917); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-A4n Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L. J. 704 (1931).
o Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700 (1939).
" See note .23 supra.
2 See, e.g., Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARv. L. REV. 494 (950); Note, Private Law-
mahfing by Trade Associations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1346 (x949); Note, Grower-Canner Agreements: An
Ab.use of Mass Standardized Contracts, 58 YALE L. J. 16x (1949).
"' McKenna, Insurance in 1944 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 784.
"Simpson, Equity in 1946 id. at 879.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
succeed in such litigation? (Does he lose a large part because of the customary
contingent fee arrangement?) What percentage of "litigatable" cases are settled by
the insurer? How big a discount must the insured take in the course of such
settlement? Is the value of the insurance as "security" (particularly life) impaired
because of the shadow of litigation and the possibility of an adverse decision by a
hard-nosed court? On the other hand, from the insurer's standpoint, what are the
consequences? How high a contingent reserve must insurers keep for satisfying
judgments based on the unpredictable "ambiguities" which courts "discover." How
much of a reserve must be kept for similar cases which the insurer decides to settle?
How costly is this whole procedure? Do the insurers pass this cost on to the insureds
in higher premium rates?
If the consequences added up to a highly undesirable state of affairs for both
insured and insurer, one might next consider alternative remedies. First, with
respect to the system as it now operates, what could be done to improve judicial
administration of insurance protection? Would a frank recognition of the facts of
insurance life by the judges help? Undoubtedly, Judge Clark's candid suggestion
that courts decide the hardship cases on equitable grounds, rather than strained
interpretation, would better preserve the symmetry of the law, but would it avoid
the evil consequences of insecurity and expense for both insured and insurer? Next,
if it is assumed that the courts are incapable of solving the problem through common
law theories as presently buttressed with insurance legislation, is more legislation
the answer? Would it be possible to draft a uniform insurance code which would
offer a wide choice of standardized policies to the insured, each approved in terms
of conformity with the reasonable expectations and needs of the insureds? (To meet
the insurer's practical objection that it competes in the market on a "special feature,"
rather than on a price basis, the alternatives in each class of insurance might be
limited only if "unfair" to the insurance buyer.) Finally, should the administration
of a quasi-public utility such as insurance be taken out of the courts and placed into
the hands of an administrative agency? What have been the consequences of state
administration of workmen's compensation? Would a state agency be subjected
to the same kind of pressure state public service commissions often succumb to, or to
put it conversely, are not the courts better guardians of the interests of the weaker
party to a one-sided bargain? (Would it continue to be a one-sided bargain if the
legislature was actually to act on behalf of the public in standardizing policies?)
This article might have been sub-tided: "Reflections on Reading Some Recent
Insurance Cases." Like most reflections, these are subject to criticism for incom-
pleteness; to become "observations" they require a kind of consideration which lay
outside the scope of this symposium. But, while not the basis for action, these reflec-
tions strongly suggest the need for further research and thought as to the special
nature of the insurance contract, if the expectations of all parties to the transaction-
the insured, the company, the beneficiaries, and all who claim thereby-are to be
protected adequately.
